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Abstract: Specific ideas about the Fisher relation between real and nominal 
interest rates and more general ideas about the nature of the central bank's 
duty to support the financial system in times of crisis were important to the 
Monetarist re-assessment of the causes of the Great Depression and what 
this event implied about the inherent stability of the market economy. 
Aspects of the evolution of these ideas since the Depression and the role that 
they have played in recent debates about the Great Recession are discussed, 
and some tentative conclusions about the validity of Monetarist ideas are 
drawn.   
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The Great Depression began in 1929, and what we are now learning to call 
the Great Recession began in 2007. In the interim, and leaving out many 
details, macroeconomics saw a failed Austrian revolution, a successful-for-
while Keynesian one, which softened into a Neo-classical synthesis and then 
succumbed to a Monetarist counter-revolution, which in turn spawned New-
classical economics, whose encounters with empirical evidence provoked 
New-Keynesian and Real-business-cycle reactions, a new-New-classical 
synthesis, and so on . . . and on.   
 So to what extent if any did developments in economics between 
these two crises influence events and commentary on them? And what effect 
did the events themselves have on that commentary? These questions are 
complicated not just because of the sheer number of interacting ideas that 
are potentially relevant to them, but also because the development of those 
ideas between our two crises has not been linear. Over the years, specific 
hypotheses and broad themes alike have appeared, faded into the 
background, sometimes to re-emerge in more refined and careful 
formulations, and sometimes not.  
 But we have to start somewhere, and despite all the above-mentioned 
revolutions, counter-revolutions, syntheses and what-not, a number of ideas 
already around in the late 1920s are still in circulation, and have both 
influenced and been influenced by events. In this essay I shall focus on two 
of these: a specific hypothesis - that there is an inflation-related relationship 
- usually known as the Fisher relation - between real and nominal interest 
rates; and a broader theme - the notion that the central bank has a special 
responsibility for promoting or at least maintaining the stability of the 
monetary and financial system.  
 
The two ideas’ significance for the one question 
These two particular ideas are especially interesting, because in the 1960s 
and '70s, between our two crises, they featured prominently in the 
Monetarist reassessment of the Great Depression, which helped to establish 
the dominance in macroeconomic thought of the view that, far from being a 
manifestation of deep flaws in the very structure of the market economy, as 
it had at first been taken to be, this crisis was the consequence of serious 
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policy errors visited upon an otherwise robustly self-stabilizing system. The 
crisis that began in 2007 has re-opened this question1 .  
 At some risk of over-simplification, the basis for the Monetarist view, 
notably as it is expounded by Allan Meltzer (2003), can be put as follows: 
had the Fed's policy makers been fully aware of the real-nominal interest 
rate distinction in the years of the Great Depression, they would have been 
more likely to understand that, as a falling price level began to take hold of 
the US economy, even though policy interest rates were cut, monetary policy 
was becoming tighter, not more expansionary. They would then have 
supplied liquidity to the banking system and therefore to the economy more 
promptly, not to say vigorously and consistently, in order to stabilize both. 
Had they done so, 1929 would have marked the beginning of a run-of-the-
mill cyclical down-turn, not of a catastrophe that changed the world’s 
history. The Great Depression, that is to say, was the unnecessary 
consequence of policy errors, not an inevitable manifestation of the inherent 
instability of capitalism.  
 On this reading of the history of macroeconomic thought, Fed. policy 
before and during the Great Recession of recent years might then be 
interpreted as a series of welcome, if sometimes clumsy, efforts by 
Chairman Bernanke to keep his famous 90th birthday promise to Milton 
Friedman on behalf of the Fed that, in the light of what it had learned from 
him and Anna Schwartz (1963) about its responsibility for the Great 
Depression, it would not "do it again". But recent Fed policy has not been 
interpreted this way by many of the economists who nowadays seem to 
display the most faith in the market economy's inherent stability, among 
them some of the very above-mentioned scholars who were responsible for 
the Monetarist re-interpretation of the Great Depression in the first place. 
The sometimes angry dissent from recent policy in which they have joined 
thus presents, at least at first sight, an intriguing puzzle, which goes to the 
very heart of debates about the nature of the market economy, and thus 
provides the fundamental motivation for this paper's focus. In what follows, 
I shall first of all discuss the role of the Fisher effect in these events and 
debates, and then take up the broader issue of the responsibilities of the 
central bank.  
 
                                                 
1 This narrow choice of topics is of course also a response to limitations of time and space. Inter-war 
debates about the stabilizing possibilities of counter-cyclical government expenditures, for example, or 
about the policy constraints imposed by the then recently re-established gold standard, also find many 
echoes today, and could easily provide the basis for studies similar to this.  Related questions about the 
lessons of recent experience for viability of what is sometimes called the "social market economy" model 
have also been raised by recent experience in the European Union. . 
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The Fisher Relation 
The Fisher relation plays a central part in today's work-horse models of 
monetary policy and it had been making appearances in monetary debates 
long before the Great Depression began, indeed long before Irving Fisher 
himself discussed it with such skill and thoroughness in (1896) that his name 
became firmly and perpetually attached to it.2 The phrase in fact covers more 
than one idea. Nowadays, it is routinely used to denote a systematic 
tendency for variations in the expected inflation rate to be reflected – fully, it 
is usually assumed - in the difference between market rates of return on real 
and nominal assets, expressed in a simple equation 
 
                                                       r   =    R + p(e)  
 
Here, r is the nominal interest rate in question, R its real counterpart and p(e) 
the expected rate of price inflation. This specific tendency, however, is more 
helpfully labeled the Fisher effect, whose analysis incorporates a less 
complicated idea, also sometimes referred to as the Fisher relation, but 
which would be better called the Fisher distinction between nominal and real 
interest rates.3  In what follows, I shall try to be clear about these semantic 
matters, and use the phrase Fisher relation only when distinction and effect 
are both in play.   
  
The Fisher relation during the Great Depression 
It is at first sight curious that even the Fisher distinction, let alone the Fisher 
effect itself, seems to have played no significant part in the monetary policy 
discussions of 1929-1933, even though both were already firmly established 
in the literature by then. Meltzer (2003) sums the matter up as follows 
 "The minutes [of meetings of the Federal Reserve Board] of the 
 period, statements by Federal Reserve officials, and outside 
 commentary by economists and others do not distinguish between real 
 and nominal interest rates. Surprisingly, even Irving Fisher did not 
 insist on this distinction. Although Fisher pointed to the decline in 
 demand deposits in conversation with [Governor Eugene] Meyer, his 
 preferred explanation of the prolonged decline was the asymmetric 
 effect of deflation on debtors" (pp. 412-413)  
                                                 
2 Robert Dimand and Rebesa Gomez Betancourt (forthcoming ) survey this early history, and the later roles 
played by Fisher's ideas in the evolution of macroeconomics. 
3 Though it is really Marshall's (1887), including the vocabulary of real and nominal, as Fisher himself 
acknowledged 
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Everyone at the time, that is to say, knew that prices were falling, ought to 
have known that this implied that real interest rates were high, but no-one 
seems to have put matters this way, or perhaps even to have put two and two 
together.   
 I conjecture that this was because, by the late 1920s, explicit 
deployment of the Fisher distinction was largely confined to discussions of 
the Fisher effect itself, and that the place of the latter in the literature of the 
time was that of an hypothesis about the secular relationships among price 
level variations and interest rates, whose relevance by then had become 
subject to many doubts and qualifications, mainly empirical, which Fisher 
himself shared.4 By this time also, such leading authorities as John Maynard 
Keynes and Ralph Hawtrey had already either, in the first case - see (1923, p 
.20) - expressed explicit doubts about the practical significance of the effect 
because it failed to take account of variations in the degree of confidence 
with which expectations were held, or, in the second case – compare (1919) 
with (1913) - had simply stopped deploying it. And neither distinction nor 
effect figured systematically at this time in the then emerging and novel 
Austrian theory of the cycle which nevertheless focused on the interaction of 
bank lending rates and the expected rate of return on capital,.  
 Fisher himself, furthermore, had never claimed more than marginal 
relevance for the effect – as opposed to the distinction - for cyclical 
phenomena, concluding in (1930) that, in this context "the money rate of 
interest and still more the real rate of interest, is more affected by the 
instability of money than by those more fundamental and more normal 
causes connected with income impatience, and opportunity"; and by the late 
1920s, discussions of monetary policy, his own included, had in any event  
been conditioned by a prior six or seven years of price-level stability which 
had rendered even the distinction redundant, at least temporarily. In short, 
the Fisher effect was absent from the discussions during our first crisis 
because it did not seem to anyone to be particularly relevant to questions 
about counter-cyclical monetary policy, and the Fisher distinction had fallen 
into disuse along with it.  
                                                 
4 Fisher's original (1896) empirical investigation had found evidence of only a weak and partial adjustment 
of nominal interest rates to falling prices, and his subsequent updating and broadening of the scope of the 
experience he examined, reported in (1930, Ch 19)), did no more than confirm and generalize this 
conclusion. As he summed up the evidence it "since forethought is imperfect, the effects are smaller than 
the theory requires and lag behind price movements, in some periods, very greatly" (p.491 [451]); to be 




 The discussions in question would certainly have been clearer, 
particularly to later readers in whose intellectual equipment the Fisher 
distinction occupies a central place, had it been deployed more often during 
the Depression years. But whether this want of clarity was decisive for the 
quality of decision making is another matter. The distinction was not in fact 
needed by anyone familiar with then common ways of thinking about 
monetary policy in order to assess the significance of the behavior of interest 
rates under Fed control. These ways of thinking taught, among other things, 
that policy's tightness or looseness could be assessed by comparing the level 
of interest rates to expectations about what Henry Thornton (1802) had long 
before called the "rate of mercantile profit", and such a comparison could of 
course be made in either nominal or real terms, so long as consistency was 
observed.  
 This is why Hawtrey (1919), for example, had been able to drop the 
Fisher distinction from his analytic armory without any loss of substance, 
and write only about nominal interest rates, why it made only occasional 
appearances in Knut Wicksell's later discussions (1915), and also perhaps 
why even Fisher himself did not insist on its importance. Furthermore, 
ample data, not least those related to the shrinking money supply, were 
available to judge the stance of policy along then conventional lines. Many 
of the Fed's contemporary critics, including Hawtrey (e.g. 1932) and his 
sometime assistant Lauchlin Currie (1934), derived appropriate – from a 
Monetarist standpoint - policy advice about the need to bring about vigorous 
money growth without referring to the real-nominal interest rate distinction. 
Perhaps then, the Fed's own neglect of it should not be listed high among the 
reasons for its failure to heed such advice.  
 
The Fisher relation between the crises 
Only when monetary policy analysis is extended, as of course it long since 
has been, to incorporate an explicit theory of the rate of mercantile profit's 
relationship to the underlying micro-structure of the economy do the 
distinction between real and nominal interest rates and a theory to explain 
the relationship between them become vital elements in the analysis of 
monetary policy. With hindsight, we can now see that, even by 1929, a 
number of economists, including Fisher himself, but also those who 
belonged to what Axel Leijonhufvud (1981) called the Wicksell Connection, 
were working towards just such a theory, but even some of the questions that 
were going to need answers if it was to be constructed, let alone the answers 
themselves, had barely been formulated.  
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 Matters are now very different. Micro-foundations, though not those 
that Leijonhufvud, let alone Wicksell and his followers, envisaged, are a sine 
qua non of mainstream macroeconomics. As a result, not just the Fisher 
distinction, but the Fisher effect too, have had much more prominent places 
in economists' commentaries on the second of our crises, despite the fact 
that, already neglected in 1929, these ideas disappeared almost completely 
for a while during the Keynesian ascendency that followed the Great 
Depression..  
 Keynes himself, who had already expressed doubts about the Fisher 
effect in (1923), set the dominant tone for much subsequent discussion in the 
General Theory, (1936). There he denied a direct effect of expected inflation 
on nominal interest rates, arguing that any links here were indirect, running 
through the influence of rising prices on the nominal value of the marginal 
efficiency of capital (see 1936, pp. 141-143). His disciple Sir Roy Harrod, 
one of the two authorities – the other being Sir John Hicks – who in 1959 
informed the Radcliffe Committee that the long run equilibrium value of the 
long rate of interest was three per cent, was sticking firmly to this line as late 
as (1971, pp. 179-`80) and indeed took it further, denying the very logical 
possibility of expected inflation affecting the yield on bonds, on the ground 
that, like money itself, these were nominal assets. And though Hicks did not 
follow Harrod into this particular analytic error, he still wrote as follows as 
late as 19895.  
 "it is commonly thought that these high rates of interest [since 1950] 
 are a consequence of inflation: that if prices are rising at 4 per cent per 
 annum, a nominal rate of interest of 8 per cent per annum is 
 equivalent to a real rate of 4. It is true that inflation makes these high 
 rates of interest bearable, so that their consequences are not so 
 desperate as they would have been in the past. But to make these 
 consequences into causes surely takes things the wrong way round." 
 (1989, p.79) 
Even so, this quotation tells us that by the 1980s, the Fisher effect was back 
in play and "commonly thought" to be true; and it also hints, surely 
accurately, that this was in part the result of the so-called Great Inflation of 
                                                 
5 It is an unexplained puzzle in the Keynesian literature that the Radcliffe Report itself (Committee on the 
Working of the Monetary System 1959) of all documents, provided an exception to the general tenor of 
Keynesian discussions of these matters, by suggesting (p. 211) that sustained inflation in the two per cent 
range might create expectations that would raise the above-mentioned normal value of the long-run rate of 
interest from 3 to 5 percent.   
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that time and, by inference, of the Monetarist counter-revolution whose 
success this episode helped to promote.  
 But the idea's revival was nevertheless not quite straightforward. To 
be sure, it was embodied explicitly in eq. (9) (p. 9) of that counter-
revolution's opening manifesto, Friedman's (1956) "The Quantity Theory of 
Money, a Restatement", but with no citation of Fisher himself, and 
accompanied by the warning that "differences of opinion [about expected 
inflation] cannot be neglected, so we cannot suppose (9) to hold; indeed, one 
of the most consistent features of inflation seems to be that it does not" 
(pp.9-10).6  What Friedman had to say about the Fisher effect in this seminal 
essay thus implied doubts about its empirical relevance that could have been, 
and indeed had been, expressed, in the 1920s, not least by Keynes (1923) as 
we have already noted.  
 Twelve years later, in his famous AEA Presidential address (1968), 
Friedman's treatment of the Fisher distinction and of the Fisher effect was 
less hesitant when he cited them as the inspiration for his introduction of 
inflation expectations into the Phillips curve and he expressed no doubts 
there about the effect's empirical significant or policy-relevance. The main 
burden of Friedman's address was to promulgate the "natural unemployment 
rate" hypothesis, whose validity required full adjustment of wage-inflation to 
expectations about price inflation, so even though he pointed out that 
experience showed the adjustment of nominal interest rates to inflation to be 
"slow to develop and slow to disappear" (p. 101) and left the explicit 
question of its completeness unexamined, it was all too easy for his readers 
unthinkingly to apply the hypothesis of full adjustment when analyzing the 
behaviour of interest rates as well.  
 This is what seems to have happened, particularly when formal 
treatments of Monetarist ideas evolved into New-classical models. It was, 
after all, very difficult to write down a model of an economy in which 
money-wage inflation responded fully to inflation expectations but nominal 
interest rates did not, particularly when the idea of rational expectations had 
become the foundation for modeling the formation of those expectations and 
their influence across all markets.7 Thus, though Friedman’s (1968) paper, 
                                                 
6 That Friedman took this warning seriously is confirmed by the fact that the rate of return on bonds and 
the expected rate of inflation figured as separate variables in that essay's equation (11) which restated the 
quantity theory as a theory of the demand for money.  
 
7 Even before 1968 moreover, Martin J Bailey (1962) and Robert Mundell (1963) had shown that, within 
the then ubiquitous IS-LM framework, a fully realized Fisher effect could be reconciled with an apparent 
failure of nominal interest rates to adapt fully to inflation, because its effects would be shared between 
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not to mention Edmund Phelps' (1967) parallel piece, had appeared in 
advance of the empirical experience of inflation that established their 
relevance, by the end of the 1970s, real-nominal wage and interest rate 
distinctions and the importance of expected inflation in the Phillips curve, 
were both firmly established in macroeconomics.  
 The specific policy measure that Monetarism brought with it into the 
policy sphere - money growth targeting - proved much less widely attractive, 
let alone durable. This scheme arguably served as a useful cover for the 
Volcker disinflation of the early 1980s, but was otherwise soon judged 
impractical in the U.S. and in other places too. On the policy front, and also 
in academic discourse about it, what then emerged was a sort of 
“Monetarism without money”, which retained low and stable inflation as a 
policy target and an overall emphasis on the importance of inflation-
expectations in models of how to attain it, but replaced money growth with a 
nominal interest rate as the central bank’s key instrument. The formal 
models that supported this approach to policy were well entrenched in 
central banks by the turn of the millennium and dominated policy making 
and much of the debate about it in the run up the crisis that began in 2007.  
 
The Fisher relation and the onset of the Great Recession 
Only the briefest reminder of these models' generic form is needed here. 
They have three components: an expectations augmented Phillips curve, 
which determines inflation as a deviation from expected inflation that is 
positively related to an “output gap”, the deviation of aggregate output from 
some long-run “normal” level; a misnamed – here we shall let this pass - IS 
curve, whereby this output gap is inversely related to the real rate of interest, 
which in turn has a “normal” "neutral" or “natural” value at which the output 
gap is zero, unemployment is at its natural rate, and inflation is therefore 
constant at its expected rate; and a policy reaction function, these days 
typically an explicit “Taylor rule”, according to which the central bank sets 
the nominal interest rate, and hence, through the Fisher effect, a real rate, so 
as to influence the output gap and keep inflation on some predetermined low 
and steady time path.  
 The Fisher relation is thus completely central to "Monetarism without 
money", and to the policy discussions that this approach has continued to 
frame even after 2007. Specifically, the relation: has provided the basis for 
criticisms that the Fed's policy rate was set “too low” in the years before 
                                                                                                                                                 
nominal and real rates, and this so called non-super-neutrality of money result proved easy to reproduce in 
a variety of models too wide to cite here.  
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2007, and therefore contributed to - in some versions, notably that of John 
Taylor (2011) caused – the crisis; has been fundamental to discussions of the 
so-called zero lower bound problem posed by the possibility of the economy 
encountering some shock in response to which a mechanical application of 
the Taylor rule would prescribe an impossible to achieve negative value for 
the nominal interest rate; and has also figured in arguments about the extent 
to which, as the crisis gathered momentum, additional "unorthodox" 
measures might, or might not, be needed to supplement what by then had 
become "orthodox" interest rate based monetary policy. . 
 There is a strong parallel here between these criticisms of Fed policy 
in the years that preceded the Great Recession and some that were advanced 
with respect to the Great Depression. In each case it has been argued that 
interest rates were kept too low for too long and fuelled speculative bubbles 
- in the housing market before 2007 and the stock market before 1929 – 
whose collapse ushered in serious and cumulative dislocations of the 
financial system. The reasons given for these mistakes however, if mistakes 
indeed they were, differ between the episodes. In the late 1920s the Fed's 
alleged error was put down to its desire to help other countries, and 
particularly the UK, to cope with the stresses of returning to the gold 
standard at parities that in some cases were, to say the least, optimistic. More 
recently, the charge has been that the Taylor rule was ignored in the interests 
of sustaining the economy's recovery from the collapse of the preceding dot-
com bubble. In the late 1920s, Fed policy unambiguously did not lead to any 
general upsurge in inflation, so the Fisher relation is irrelevant to judging its 
appropriateness. In the mid 2000s, however, judgments about whether or not 
the Taylor rule, to which the Fisher relation is central, was violated seem to 
depend, in part at least, upon how inflation is measured.8 
 To be more specific, between 2002 and 2008 CPI inflation in the US 
rose from a little under 2 per cent to over 4 percent, and as Taylor's work 
(e.g. 2011) has clearly shown, a policy model using this index would have 
called for a higher interest rate long before 2006, but over the same period, 
the Fed's preferred measure, core PCE inflation, remained firmly in a 
"comfort zone" around 2 per cent per annum, and on this criterion, policy 
was about right. This is not a debate to be settled here, but permit me the 
luxury of quoting my own pre-crisis (early 2006) view of this matter9: 
                                                 
8Here we have an interesting example of the way in which the achievement of extra clarity in thinking 
about one matter, instead of settling an issue, simply reveals the need for clarity about a further question.        
9 Core inflation often is a good predictor of longer run trends, and on this ground is arguably the right 
measure to pay attention to in assessing expected inflation when calibrating a Taylor rule with respect to 
the Fisher effect. On the other hand, food and energy prices are excluded from core indices, people do 
 11
 "Local experts know more about how strong a case can be made for 
 the existence of a housing market bubble, and about how much of it 
 can be attributed to monetary policy as opposed to other features of 
 the US scene . . .but even so, perhaps a Fed constrained by, say, a 2 
 per cent inflation target for the CPI (as opposed to some measure of 
 core inflation) would not have responded to the "dot com" collapse 
 quite so vigorously and for quite so long, while still managing to 
 maintain financial stability in its wake" Laidler (Feb. 2006) 
Let me add, however, that though I obviously think that there is something 
to be said for Taylor's case against the Fed, I don't believe that his can be the 
whole story of the causes of the subsequent crisis. Monetary policy in all 
likelihood was too expansionary before 2007, and it did then tighten up. This 
turnaround was likely to lead to a slowdown in the economy or even a 
recession, but there was nothing in the relevant data on the stance of 
monetary policy, whether indicated by the behaviour of short interest rates 
or indeed of money growth, that foreshadowed the violence of the economic 
dislocation that followed. In this respect, the onset of the Great Recession 
also resembles that of the Great Depression. I have elsewhere (e.g  Laidler 
2011) suggested that the collapse of the US housing bubble (and similar 
bubbles elsewhere in Spain, Ireland and the UK) has a rather Austrian, 
perhaps better Robertsonian, appearance to it, implying a pre-crisis 
dislocation in the inter-temporal allocation of resources that Monetarism, 
with or without money, simply does not encompass. Again, perhaps there is 
a parallel here with the arrival of the Great Depression 
 
Recent applications of the Fisher relation 
The Taylor rule in general, and recent debates in particular about how it 
should have been applied, make most sense when cast in terms of a model in 
which private sector agents form their inflation expectations by observing, 
among other variables, the actual inflation rate, and then use this 
information, along with their understanding of the economy's structure in 
making spending decisions. This idea underlies the requirement that, in 
implementing the Taylor rule, the monetary authorities should always raise 
(lower) their policy rate by more than any observed change in the rate of 
inflation, in order to ensure that their response results in a stabilizing 
increase (fall) in the real rate of interest that figures in the IS curve. But the 
same class of model can yield very different policy implications if a more 
                                                                                                                                                 
consume these products, and their prices are conspicuous, so perhaps what happens to them does indeed 
affect the public's perceptions and therefore expectations about inflation and hence their behaviour too. 
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radically rational view of the formation of inflation expectations is 
embedded in the system alongside the assumption that the central bank is a 
completely credible inflation targeter.  
 In such a system, provided also that the real rate of interest is uniquely 
determined independently of monetary policy by the fundamentals of 
productivity and thrift and is constant, or at least very slow to move over 
time, and provided that markets work so as to keep the decisions of 
individual agents fully coordinated,– not assumptions that I would want to 
defend, but widely deployed nevertheless - the way for the central bank to 
lower (raise) the inflation rate is to lower (raise) the nominal interest rate. 
This is because, in such a world, interest rate policy is interpreted by rational 
agents as embodying credible announcements on the central bank's part of 
its intentions concerning the future inflation rate, and these then play a 
dominant role in the evolution of the equilibrium time path, and hence also 
the actual time path, of inflation. Given the premises, the conclusion follows. 
As Minneapolis Fed President Narayam Kocherlakota has recently been 
quoted as saying, "Most of our monetary models tell us that, if the Fed 
maintains a constant nominal interest rate for ever, that will essentially 
determine the inflation rate, by way of the Fisher relation" 10  
 More specifically relevant to current circumstances, these premises 
also imply that an economy can escape from stagnation accompanied by an 
essentially zero level of short term nominal interest rates such as the US 
experienced after 2008, and the zero lower bound policy problems that go 
along with it, by having the central bank pre-announce a strategy of raising 
those rates. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe and Martin Uribe (2010) have put the 
point as follows:   
 "Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the analyzed exit strategy in 
 regard to credibility is the need to communicate to the public that the 
 increase in nominal interest rates is intended to raise inflationary 
 expectations  . . . .We believe that after observing falling inflation 
 with near zero interest rates for a sufficiently large number of quarters 
 the public will come to intuitively internalize the notion that the 
 Fisher effect has become dominant and accept the monetary 
 authority's argument of raising interest rates to fight deflationary 
 pressures" Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010)  
 In the light of such analysis, whose logical coherence is not in 
question, but whose empirical relevance depends critically on the extremely 
                                                 
10 This quotation was attributed to Kocherlakota by Steven Williamson, and caused 
Nicholas Rowe (2010) to "lose it" - in Paul Krugman's  (2010) well-chosen phrase. See Williamson, as 
quoted by Rowe, as quoted by Paul Krugman Aug 25th 2010 
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implausible assumption that the economy always remains exactly on its 
equilibrium time path, as Peter Howitt (1992) demonstrated some time ago, 
it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, although the absence of the Fisher 
effect and even the Fisher distinction from policy discussions during the 
Great Depression rendered these unnecessarily opaque to modern readers, 
the Fisher effect's role in the debate about the Great Recession has 
sometimes led to a little too much clarity for comfort.11  
 
The Central Bank's Responsibility for Financial Stability 
There are deeper lessons here too, namely that the Fisher effect's natural 
habitat is the theory of inflation in an otherwise smoothly functioning 
economy, and I have argued elsewhere (Laidler 2010, 2011) that modern 
models of such an economy have little if anything useful to say about 
monetary policy during and in the wake of financial crises, when markets are 
dislocated and inflation is not the central issue.  
 What has been referred to above as “Monetarism without money” was 
developed in the 1990s as a by-product of a view that made the central 
bank’s primary responsibility – indeed apparently its sole responsibility in 
some academic versions of the doctrine – the achievement and maintenance 
low and stable inflation. As Howitt (2011) has recently noted, the promotion 
and maintenance of financial stability thus largely disappeared from 
monetary policy’s agenda in the 1990s, as did explicit analysis of the 
monetary and financial system from the models that supported it.12 Today's 
models therefore provide no help at all with problems posed for monetary 
policy by the asset market dislocations experienced since 2007, which is 
why we must, along with policy makers, turn for guidance to earlier ways of 
thinking about the central bank's role in promoting the stability of the 
monetary and financial system, even if and as it targets the inflation rate. 
  
The Fed before the Great Depression  
The central bank's responsibility for financial system stability has been a 
topic of discussion, at some times the primary one, in the monetary policy 
literature, for a very long time. It was Henry Thornton (1802) who first 
systematically analyzed the Bank of England's position in the British 
financial system, the responsibilities that went with it, and the ways in which 
                                                 
11 Specifically, Howitt showed that the equilibrium time paths along which today's interest rate settings 
determine the future time path of inflation are unstable, in the sense that any disturbance to them, including 
of course an unanticipated change in the interest rate itself, would set up dynamics that take the economy 
away from, rather than back towards, its equilibrium path.. 
12 The definitive account of this approach, Michael Woodford’s (2003) Interest and Prices: the Theory of 
Monetary Policy seems to contain, if its index is to be believed, only one mention of financial markets.  
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the Bank should exercise these. The core of his views on these matters, 
adapted to the very different economic circumstances and institutional 
arrangements of the 1870s, were in due course codified by Walter Bagehot 
in his famous book Lombard Street (1873).13 Though Bagehot himself 
thought of his policy analysis as applying only to Britain and the Bank of 
England, they would in due course become a source of guidance elsewhere, 
not least in the US. 
 By the time of the Fed's founding in 1913, Bagehot's precepts, 
gathered together under the "lender of last resort" label, were understood – 
accurately or not is a separate question that space does not permit us to 
discuss here - to require the central bank to play an essentially passive role 
in financial markets during tranquil times, but to be ready to lend freely in 
times of crisis, albeit at a penalty rate of interest, to any and all commercial 
banks facing liquidity problems, though not to outright insolvent 
institutions.14  The primary aim here was said to be the preservation of 
solvent banks so that they could continue to meet their obligations to 
depositors and other commercial banks, thereby preventing any incipient run 
on the system gathering enough momentum to impair its capacity to serve 
the economy as its principal provider of means of exchange; or, to put 
matters more concretely: in the case of the newly founded Fed, to avoid any 
further repeats of the upheavals that had regularly bedeviled the National 
Banking system down to and including 1907 (see Oliver Sprague 1910). But 
there was a secondary aim here as well: namely, by isolating the insolvent 
and allowing them to fail, to avoid the creation moral hazard that could 
contribute to future instability.     
 But where for Bagehot the central bank's responsibilities began and 
ended with the maintenance of gold convertibility and its lender of last resort 
role, the founders and early leaders of the Fed, not to mention many of the 
economists who commented on its operations, were more ambitious. Some 
of these expected the Fed to maintain an "elastic" currency that would meet 
the "needs of trade" not just during crises, but as a matter of routine at all 
                                                 
13 Thornton ,who was one of the first to draw attention (though on only a single occasion in an 1811 
Parliamentary speech) to what would become known as the Fisher relation, was writing about a monetary 
system based on temporarily inconvertible paper, Bagehot about the gold standard. In Thornton's time 
commercial bank liabilities were mainly notes, in Bagehot's deposits were the norm, and this is not to 
mention the changes wrought on the British monetary system by the 1844 Bank Charter Act.  
14 This is the view of Bagehot that Thomas Humphrey (e.g. 2010, 2012) espouses. Though widely held, it is 
open to challenge on two points: namely, whether Bagehot primarily thought of high interest rates as a 
means of imposing a penalty on borrowers at times of crisis, or more as a means of generating a capital 
inflow and hence supporting gold convertibility, and whether he really did make a sharp distinction 
between illiquid and insolvent would-be borrowers. These matters are discussed in Laidler (2003) and 
(2004) 
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times, in the expectation that if this were achieved, financial stability would, 
in any event be maintained; while others argued that it should self-
consciously promote price level stability by taking a more active approach to 
what came to be called "credit control", this in the expectation that stability 
of the real economy would also then be assured. After what seemed for a 
while to be a successful period of learning by doing on the Fed's part in the 
1920s, the hopes and expectations of all sides would be disappointed by the 
onset of the Great Depression. A stock market boom developed as the 
decade progressed, though price inflation didn't, and when the Fed finally 
began to raise interest rates to discourage it, the real economy turned down 
in the summer of 1929, and the Great Depression was at hand.  
 
The Fed's response to the Great Depression 
The downturn was quickly followed by a stock market collapse in whose 
wake the demand for precautionary balances of money on the part of an 
increasingly nervous public began to build up, and growing fears among that 
public about the stability of the banking system greatly amplified this effect 
by causing a shift in the composition of its demand for money towards cash, 
thus draining reserves from the banks. A simultaneous and persistent failure 
on the part of the Fed to provide sufficient cash to meet this drain, and an 
increasing demand for excess reserves on the part of the banks themselves, 
made matters even worse. The Depression thus evolved in a recursive spiral 
of falling demand for goods and services, falling prices, rising demand for 
money, and falling supply, accompanied by successive waves of bank 
failures and a continuing hesitancy on the part of the Fed to expand its own 
monetary liabilities in significant amounts – though these did grow at about 
3 per cent per annum between 1929 and 1933. 
 The facts here were and are not in question, but their explanation and 
the appropriate policy response to them have been from the outset. 
Adherents of the needs of trade doctrine and an elastic currency, who were 
well represented within the Fed itself, argued that active money creation in 
advance of a real recovery would be inflationary and opted for letting events, 
about whose origins they were often unclear, take their course. In this last 
recommendation, they were joined by local adherents of the then novel 
Austrian business cycle theory, with whom they otherwise had little in 
common.15  Others – among them several erstwhile advocates of credit 
                                                 
15 See for example the contributions of Henry Parker Willis and Gottfried von Haberler to the celebrated 
1932 Harris Foundation conference held at the University of Chicago (Quincey Wright (ed) 1932). Given 
his strong (1910) endorsement of a central bank's lender of last resort role, it is interesting to note that 
Oliver Sprague was a prominent supporter of the Fed's passive attitude in the early years of the Depression.  
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control aimed at price stability – identified the Fed's failure to act promptly 
and vigorously as a lender of last resort as crucial in letting the crisis get out 
of hand in 1930-31 and called for monetary expansion to deal with the 
contraction, followed by monetary stabilization to prevent a repetition.  
  
Changing views of the central bank's role between the crises 
But, especially after the end of the Fed's short-lived experiment with open 
market operations in 1932, which outside of the last-mentioned group was 
widely believed to have shown the futility of such measures, and the 
expansion set in motion by the 1933 revaluation of gold notwithstanding, a 
body of opinion, with under-consumptionist and institutionalist connections, 
that interpreted the Depression as symptomatic of deeper flaws in the market 
economy against which the Fed would have been powerless regardless of the 
scale of its efforts, became increasingly influential in the U.S.. This tendency 
gathered momentum after the arrival of the Keynesian revolution in the late 
1930s, and in the wake of the severe downturn of 1937-38, though its 
orderly development was interrupted by the onset of war.   
 As peacetime conditions returned in the wake of World War 2, the 
resumption of the growing dominance of what came to be called Keynesian 
economics was by no-means confined to the US, and thinking about 
macroeconomic policy everywhere came to emphasize an essentially 
continuous need for fiscal measures to ensure macroeconomic stability, 
assigning monetary policy the role, at most, of supporting these by 
maintaining low interest rates, or, at least, of not getting at cross purposes 
with them should problems arise with respect to balance of payments issues 
or incipient inflationary pressures that might call for monetary treatment. 
And underpinning all this on the international institutional front was the US 
dollar dominated Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates. Even as 
monetary policy's role began to expand again in the 1950s it nevertheless 
retained a secondary place in the overall policy framework, and questions 
about the extent of the central bank's responsibilities for macroeconomic 
stability attracted relatively little attention      
 So matters would stand for a while, and the majority of economists 
seem to have taken it for granted that the experience of the 1930s justified 
all this, until Friedman and Schwartz (1963, ch. 7)) following up the by then 
largely forgotten work of Lauchlin Currie (1934) and Clark Warburton 
(1946), revived and painstakingly documented the case for believing that, 
had the Fed made enough cash available by way of lender of last resort 
activities early in the day, it might have prevented the economy's downward 
spiral after 1930 gathering momentum in the first place, or failing this, had it 
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later persevered with sufficiently vigorous open market operations, it might 
have reversed its course in 1932-33.  
 This interpretation of the Depression, albeit with certain variations in 
detail, would receive further support from, among others, Richard 
Timberlake (1978), Karl Brunner and Meltzer and their collaborators (1981), 
and more recently Meltzer (2003) and Robert Hetzel (2008); and from the 
late 1960s onwards the respectability among economists of the view that the 
market economy is, after all, inherently stable if not subjected to ill-
conceived policies was slowly but surely re-established, a development that 
provided critical intellectual support for a movement back to reliance on 
market mechanisms on a broader policy front as well, particularly in the 
wake of the great inflation that had, in the view of many, been the product of 
misconceived “Keynesian” measures and among other things had also 
destroyed the Bretton Woods system.  
In due course, after the fits and starts of the 1980s that followed the 
abandonment of money growth targeting, "Monetarism without money", 
whose principal characteristics have already been outlined earlier, would 
emerge as the dominant approach to monetary policy among central banks, 
not least the Fed, and indeed to macroeconomic policy thinking more 
generally, and it was underpinned by beliefs in the inherent stability of 
markets that had become at least as widely and unquestioningly accepted as 
beliefs about their instability had been three decades or so earlier. Just as 
rapid real expansion accompanied by price level stability for which 
confident central bankers could apparently take some credit had set the scene 
in the US for a Great Depression which very few commentators had 
foreseen, so did the ensuing “Great Moderation”, experienced far beyond US 
borders, set the scene for the equally unexpected Great Recession16 
 
The Great Recession and the Fed's reaction 
The Great Recession has not been a carbon copy of its predecessor. The 
years that preceded both events saw an asset market boom to be sure - in the 
stock market in the first case and the housing market in the second - and 
both booms were supported by innovations in financial markets too – 
income trusts and the like in the late 1920s, and securitized mortgages, credit 
default swaps, and what have you in the 2000s. And in each case, these 
                                                 
16 But some did have forebodings of trouble, in both instances. In the case of the Depression, see e.g. the 
remarks of Dennis Robertson (1928) on the developing U.S. situation, and Lionel Robbins (1934) for 
retrospective reflections on the concerns of the Austrians. More recently, the research department of the 
BIS was a source of frequent warnings of trouble ahead – see e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002)   
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booms eventually prompted monetary tightening that brought them to abrupt 
ends that were quickly followed by violent real economic downturns.  
 In 2007- 08, as in 1929-31, moreover, the Fed's its actions were at first 
hesitant, even inconsistent at times, and created much confusion. Even so, 
the reinterpretation of the Great Depression that the 1960s an '70s had seen 
had not been entirely forgotten apparently, not surprisingly, perhaps, given 
Chairman Bernanke’s own important contributions to the literature dealing 
with the 1930s (e.g. 1983), and the failure of Lehmann Brothers in 
September 2008 was not only the first, but also and crucially the last, major 
institutional collapse it permitted, rather than the first of a sequence as the 
1930 closing of the Bank of the United States had been. Furthermore, the 
subsequent rescue of the insurance company AIG among other things very 
likely prevented a repeat performance in Europe of the kind of crisis 
associated with the 1931 failure of Credit-Anstalt.  
 Furthermore, as the real economy went into the sharpest down-turn of 
the post-war years, the Fed, having quickly cut its policy interest rate 
essentially to zero, departed vigourously from the example it had set in the 
early 1930s and entered financial markets on a massive scale in two 
programs of so-called "quantitative easing", simply a new name for open 
market operations very similar to those that it had then been so hesitant to 
deploy in this earlier episode. Money growth fell close to zero for a while, 
and inflation fell too – the precise figures in each case depend on which 
aggregate and price index are specified – but there was no actual downward 
spiral of money and prices such as marked the Great Depression; nor was 
there a complete collapse of the real economy, which is not to belittle the 
seriousness of the stagnation of output and employment that the last four 
years have seen in the US. At the time of writing, moreover, money growth, 
on most conventional measures at least, has begun to pick up, and a very 
hesitant recovery seems to be under way. 
 Much more than monetary stimulus was at work in the US after 2007, 
of course. The prevention of further major failures after Lehmann Brothers 
saw the Fed working in close but often improvised collaboration with the 
Treasury as the Federal government became a major shareholder in large 
banks and mortgage providers, not to mention the automobile industry. 
Fiscal stimulus too was applied on a scale that Herbert Hoover could only 
have dreamed of in 1930-3117. As with the overall policy response to the 
                                                 
17 We sometimes need to remind ourselves that, in the US, the case for fiscal stimulus as a counter-cyclical 
measure was widely canvassed in the 1920s, not least by Wesley C. Mitchell and his associates (See e.g. 
Mitchell et al (1923), prepared and published under the patronage of Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
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Great Depression, so in the case of the Great Recession, historians will long 
debate which measures helped recovery, which harmed its prospects, and 
what their longer term consequences for the US economy and body-politic 
might be. But here we have quite enough to discuss if we confine ourselves 
to the Fed's behaviour, and in particular to the criticism it has provoked from 
a number of prominent Monetarists and certain others who share their strong 
commitment to rule-guided monetary policy.18  
 
Some criticisms of Fed policy since 2007 
These critics' bill of particulars against the Fed includes the following: that it 
has exceeded the bounds of its responsibilities as lender of last resort by 
rescuing insolvent investment banks and insurance companies rather than 
limiting itself to providing liquidity to solvent commercial banks; that by co-
operating with the Treasury in many of these activities it has surrendered its 
policy making independence, and that the massive increase in its cash 
liabilities that has resulted from these policies and subsequent quantitative 
easing, carries with it a serious inflationary threat. 
 There can be no doubt that since 2008, as Humphrey (2010) (2012) in 
particular stresses, the Fed  has exceeded the boundaries of the Bagehotian 
rules for a lender of last resort referred to earlier by at least as much as it fell 
short of them after 1929. But, as I argued in Laidler (2004) behind any 
specific version of these rules, there has always lain a much more general, 
albeit less precisely formulated, principle which has informed the theory of 
central banking since Thornton: namely, that the central bank, the entity 
whose liabilities are used to meet what Hyman Minsky (1982) usefully 
labeled "survival constraints" among the institutions making up the 
monetary and financial system, has a public obligation to do whatever is 
necessary to keep that system functioning.  
 This more general principle has always created room for other kinds 
of intervention than lending to sound borrowers and engaging in open 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hoover.) The story of how Hoover's faltering efforts to deploy such policy in the early years of the 
depression came to nothing is told by William Barber (1985).   
18In this group, with which I would usually expect to find myself in agreement, I include in particular Allan 
Meltzer, the late Anna Schwartz, and John Taylor, though the latter does not have quite the same track 
record as a monetarist as the other two. Note that I would on this occasion exclude such commentators as 
Timothy Congdon (2011), Robert Hetzel (2012) and that group of bloggers known as the "marker 
monetarists", which includes Lars Christensen, Scott Sumner, Nicholas Rowe and Hetzel – See Christensen 
(2011) for a survey of their work. These have all consistently advocated measures designed to increase 
money growth in recent years, and have sounded many themes similar to those explored here in their work. 
Thomas Humphrey 's (2010) (2012)  papers on the Fed's behaviour as a lender of last resort, especially the 
first of them, seem to me to place his work in an intermediate position between these two branches of 
monetarist commentary, as I hope emerges clearly from the following discussion, which owes a debt to 
correspondence with Humphrey..  
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market operations, and its implementation has often involved co-operation 
with the relevant political authorities as well. The specific Bagehotian rules 
summarized earlier evolved from precepts that has been developed with the 
mid-19th century Bank of England in mind, whose prime goal was the 
maintenance of gold convertibility in a financial system where the 
distinction between liquidity and solvency was, to say the least, blurred by 
the absence of limited liability arrangements for the owners of and/or 
shareholders in banks. Whether these rules should have been expected to 
provide adequate guidance for the early 21st century Fed, operating in a very 
different institutional environment was surely an open question in 2007, and 
the fact that they were frequently violated in the years that followed ought 
not, in and of itself, be grounds for criticism.  
 To be more specific: Lehmann Brothers was not a commercial bank, 
and its liabilities did not form part of the money supply, but its failure 
caused interbank credit markets (in Europe as well as the US) to seize up 
and threatened to paralyze much of the world's commercial banking system 
too, just as the failure of LTCM – a hedge fund - would have done in 1998, 
or for that matter, though perhaps on a more local scale, the failure of Baring 
Brothers – a merchant bank – might have done as long ago as 1890; and 
critics of the rescue of AIG – an insurance company to be sure - need to 
explain, in the light of the international composition of its counterparty list 
and the magnitudes of its obligations, why its failure would not have led to a 
banking system collapse in Europe, like that of the early 1930s already 
mentioned above, which, as Barry Eichengreen (1992) tells us, was 
precipitated by a sudden withdrawal of US lenders from European markets, 
and which, on some interpretations marked a decisively destructive turning 
point in the Ccontinent's political fortunes..  
 The contemporary relevance or otherwise of Bagehot's rules is in any 
case not a question to be settled definitively by reference to anecdotes about 
recent events. That monetary economics needs to evolve along with the 
institutions of the monetary economy is not a new idea. I have already noted 
that Bagehot's development of Thornton's ideas about the appropriate role of 
the central bank was heavily conditioned by institutional changes that had 
occurred in Britain between 1802 and 1873, and, as I noted in (2004), to this 
example may be added that of a similar evolution of ideas between 1873 and 
1932 when Hawtrey’s Art of Central Banking appeared. Any assessment of 
recent monetary policy in the US likewise needs to be explicitly informed by 
the fact that today's financial system is very different from and far more 
complex than the one for which Bagehot's principles, even in any of the 
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early 20th century versions that informed Hawtrey’s analysis and with which 
the Fed's founders were familiar, were designed.  
 Some of the Fed's recent critics (e.g. , the late Anna Schwartz  - see 
Brian Carney 2008, or on this particular matter, Humphrey 2010) have 
argued that such time-honoured principles would have proved adequate in 
recent circumstances; but Robert Hetzel (2012) seems less sure of this. 
Furthermore, the only systematic study of which I am aware of the place 
occupied by the Fed in today's financial system, and what this might imply 
about its responsibilities, Perry Mehrling's New Lombard Street: How the 
Fed became the Dealer of Last Resort (2011) argues explicitly - as its title 
implies - that institutional developments have rendered the traditional rules, 
though not the broad principle lying behind them, hopelessly outdated. 
Mehrling argues that the growth of the Fed's balance sheet since 2008 is an 
outcome of its having been conscious of this fact and acted accordingly as it 
sought to maintain the monetary and financial system in working order, and 
Hetzel (2012) reaches a similar conclusion by a more traditional monetarist 
route.  
 It should go without saying that it will take more than these two 
studies to settle so multi-faceted and complicated an issue, but those who 
dispute their conclusions surely need to argue the point with explicit 
reference to the nature of today's financial system and with the same 
attention to detail as their authors have displayed. In the interim, it might 
also be noted explicitly that the policy environment after the collapse of 
Lehmann Bothers left no-one with the time to await the outcome of such an 
academic debate. Fed and Treasury policies after 2008 were improvised 
because they had to be. 
 The charge that the Fed has surrendered independence by co-
operating with the US Treasury during the recent crisis, to which both 
Meltzer and Schwartz have given particular attention, also needs to be 
discussed in historical and institutional context, because such co-operation in 
one form or another has often been seen in the past. In the British crisis of 
1793, which first prompted Henry Thornton – not to mention Francis Baring 
- to write about the Bank of England's place in the monetary system, it was 
the Exchequer that acted as lender of last resort, not the Bank; and in 1797, 
when the Bank did better, its suspension of convertibility required legislative 
sanction; the well-known relaxations of the Bank Charter Act's provisions 
regarding the Bank of England's gold reserves in 1847, 1857 and 1866, 
which did so much to stabilize the financial system during the crises of those 
years, also needed political action; Chancellor of the Exchequer Viscount 
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Goschen was a prominent actor in the often confused but ultimately 
successful, resolution of the 1890 Baring Crisis; and so on.   
 Closer to the present time, certainly the Fed's policies in the early 
1930s, when the Secretary of the Treasury was a member of the Board, were 
no model for that institution's future behaviour, but the reforms of 1935, 
though they broke this particular link, were largely aimed at clarifying lines 
of responsibility within the system and improving its capacity to make 
decisions, not at enabling it to deploy that capacity independently of the rest 
of government. Indeed, even after the famous Accord of 1951 when the 
Fed’s primacy in matters of monetary policy was finally established, it has 
always styled itself, in the words of its then Chairman, William McChesney 
Martin, "independent within [not of] government", a description that surely 
signifies a willingness - even perhaps an obligation - to co-operate with 
other agencies.   
 
Quantitative easing, money and credit 
Since 2009, the monetary liabilities created as direct by-products of the Fed's 
"dealer of last resort" activities have been supplemented by quantitative 
easing on a massive scale. The explicitly stated purpose of these recent 
"open market operations a outrance" - as Keynes called such measures when 
he advocated them for the US in (1930)  - was to drive down long-term 
interest rates, also the goal of the later "operation twist". As Humphrey 
(2010) and Hetzel (2011) have both correctly pointed out, the case for 
quantitative easing has thus been based not upon a view of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy which stresses the role of money growth and 
which played a central role in the Monetarist re-evaluation of the Great 
Depression, but rather on one that figures prominently in Chairman 
Bernanke’s own academic work (e.g. (1983) and Bernanke and Gertler 
1995) and emphasizes credit market effects in general, and the long rate of 
interest in particular, an emphasis also very reminiscent of Keynes' (1930) 
first reactions to the Great Depression.  
 As the Depression took its course, Keynes himself would begin to 
doubt the effectiveness of such measures, because he had come to believe 
that a positive floor to the value of the long interest rate was inherent in the 
functioning of financial market mechanisms and created a fundamental 
barrier both to the economy's capacity for self-stabilization and to monetary 
policy's ability to overcome it. It is quite understandable therefore, that 
anyone wishing to defend claims about the market economy's inherent 
stability as the current crisis has evolved would also wish to maintain a 
decent intellectual distance from Fed thinking about the role of interest rates 
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in general, and the long rate in particular. And any worries in this regard can 
only have been enhanced by Paul Krugman's frequent and surely influential 
invocation of related ideas - though his notion of a liquidity trap has short 
term interest rates at a zero minimum, not long rates at a low minimum - as 
he has made his case for relying on fiscal as opposed to monetary stimulus 
as the cure for today's stagnation.19  
 The intellectual, not to say political, stakes here are very high, because 
Krugman has deployed such ideas not just to attack current Fed policy, but 
also to attack the Monetarist re-interpretation of the Great Depression, which 
he rightly sees as a major obstacle to the reinstatement of his preferred 
answer to the fundamental question underlying this essay, namely that that 
the market economy is indeed inherently unstable and therefore in need of 
continuous government management. Krugman has returned time and again 
to these themes. As long ago as 2008, even before the dust created by the 
Lehmann Brothers failure had settled, he was already asking, "Has anyone 
noticed that the current crisis sheds light on one of the great controversies of 
economic history?", and, after summarizing Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) 
conclusions about the Fed's policy failures in the Great Depression, he 
continued  
 "Here we are, facing a new crisis reminiscent of the 1930s. and this 
 time the Fed  has been spectacularly aggressive about expanding the 
 monetary base: and guess what – it doesn't seem to be working. I think 
 the thesis of the Monetary History has just taken a hit." (Nov. 28, 
 2008),  
More recently, he has argued as follows. 
 Now, what monetary policy ordinarily involves is open market 
 operations: the central bank increases the supply of money by 
 purchasing and removing from the market non-money assets. And this 
 has traction because money is different from those other assets. In a 
 liquidity trap, however, money isn't different: at the margin an open 
 market operation just exchanges one store of value for another, with 
 no economic effect" (Sept. 13 2011)       .         .    
It will be interesting to see what Krugman will make of the noticeable upturn 
in money growth (on most conventional measures) that was already in 
                                                 
19 On the historical and analytic importance of these differences, to which Krugman appears to be 
oblivious, See Roger Sandilands (2010). It should be made clear that Krugman does not so much oppose 
quantitative easing as expect little from it. To the extent that it is effective in holding down long interest 
rates, and hence ensuring that monetary policy does not blunt the effectiveness of fiscal policy, he approves 
of it. See Krugman (2012). A particularly forceful critic of fiscal stimulus from the outset has been Robert 
J. Barro, who has nevertheless sometimes taken a tolerant view of the Fed’s efforts to stabilize the financial 
system.  See Barro (2009)  
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progress in the US as he wrote this last passage, and of the still tentative 
recovery of economic activity that seems to be following it. 
 My own conjecture about the current state of play in the US is that we 
may now be seeing the beginnings of a vindication of Ralph Hawtrey's 
(1932) view of the purpose and likely effects of open market operations, 
which was both simpler and more optimistic than Keynes's  
 "there must a limit to the amount of money that sellers [of securities] 
 will hold idle, and it follows that by this process [open market 
 operations] the vicious circle of deflation can always be broken, 
 however great the stagnation of business and  the reluctance of 
 borrowers might be." (1932, pp. 173-4)     
Perhaps hope would be a better word to use here than conjecture, however. 
Hetzel (2012) for one does not share my optimism about monetary policy's 
recent course, and it is indeed far from clear that further expansion of the 
monetary base will not be needed to keep the current incipient expansion 
going; nor am I enthusiastic about the likely effects of yet another 
application of "operation twist" aimed explicitly at maintaining downward 
pressure on the long interest rate. Even so, if my hope is after all fulfilled, 
then the Fed, perhaps inadvertently because the promotion of money growth 
has been notable absent from its case for quantitative easing, might after all 
be now getting on track to keep that birthday promise to Friedman 
mentioned earlier.20 
 
Explaining the critics' discomfort 
All this brings us face to face with a key puzzle posed by the reactions to the 
Fed's recent policies of some of its Monetarist critics, who since 2008 have 
not only questioned the Fed's views on how its policies are supposed to 
work, but the policies themselves, even though these have been remarkably 
similar to what some of them recommended with hindsight for the US in the 
early 1930s and for Japan in the 1990s too, when that economy's lost decade 
was actually in progress  Meltzer occupies a prominent place in this group, 
and he offered the following explanation for his position in (Nov. 4th, 2010): 
 "Would Milton Friedman have endorsed the Federal Reserve's plan to 
 make large scale purchases of Treasury bonds? . . . I am certain he 
 would not. 
                                                 
20 Since this passage was written, we have of course seen the introduction of "QE3" by the Fed., which 
indicates that it shared Hetzel's more pessimistic view of the state of play.  It should be clear from what has 
already been written that I am not in the least disturbed at having my own optimism corrected in this was .I 
am an enthusiastic supporter of these recent measures in as much as they involve inducing further increases 
in the monetary base, but remain uncomfortable with the specific emphasis laid on accompanying 
commitments to hold the long interest rate down. 
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 Friedman's main message for central banks was to maintain a 
 monetary rule that kept the growth of the money supply constant. In 
 his Newsweek column "Inflation and Jobs" (Nov. 12, 1979) for 
 example, Friedman emphasized that 'unemployment is.  . . a side 
 effect of the cure for inflation' so that if a central bank 'cured' 
 unemployment by inflating, it 'will have unemployment later'. In 
 other words don't try it          
                                                          --  ---  ---   ---   
 Friedman made an exception to his rule about steady state monetary 
 policy in case of deflation. When prices fell, as they had in the Great 
 Depression or in Japan in the 1990s, he urged the central bank to 
 increase money growth. I served as one of two honorary advisors to 
 the Bank of Japan in the 1990s. With short term rates close to zero, I 
 gave the same advice, urging the bank several times to buy long-term 
 bonds or foreign exchange to increase money growth until deflation 
 ended. 
 All this is not relevant now, since there is no sign of deflation in the 
 United States. The Fed's claim that there is a risk of deflation should 
 embarrass it". 
 Let us leave arguments about whether or not these really would have 
been Friedman's views in 2010 for some other occasion. What matters here 
is the substance of the argument, which is that monetary policy should 
adhere to long-run rules except in conditions of outright deflation. Though 
Meltzer's chosen rule – stable money growth – differs from John Taylor's, 
which involves manipulating short term interest rates in order to maintain 
low and stable inflation, the emphasis laid by both Meltzer and Taylor (e.g. 
2011) on the critical importance of maintaining rule guided monetary policy 
geared to long term goals even under current circumstances is the same, and 
so are their conclusion about what this implies about the wisdom (or rather 
recklessness) of quantitative easing at a time when low nominal interest rates 
are not being turned into high real rates by deflation and the Fisher effect. 
 This view of today's policies deserves to be taken seriously, because it 
is not quite so far removed from that espoused by some prominent advocates 
of monetary expansion during the early years of the Great Depression as it 
might seem to be at first sight. Irving Fisher, for example, was a tireless 
advocate of such policies by almost any means in the early 1930s, but he 
saw the aim of monetary expansion as the restoration of the price level to its 
pre-depression level, at which, once achieved, it should thereafter be 
stabilized. And by (1936) Henry Simons, one of the leaders of the Chicago 
group who had also advocated vigorous monetary expansion earlier in the 
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decade, was once again famously taking up Fisher's old arguments for a 
price stability rule for monetary policy which he saw as a vital adjunct to the 
Positive Program for Laissez-Faire that he had laid out in (1934). This time 
around, as Meltzer explicitly notes, there has been no deflation to speak of – 
if indeed any at all - and hence no case to be made along such lines as these 
for monetary expansion either, leaving only the rule guided stabilization 
element in the Fisher-Simons agenda as relevant to current conditions.   
 This same line of argument should also have led its exponents to warn 
that the Fed's recent policies have risked generating price inflation, and of 
course it did.  A major concern expressed by Thomas Humphrey about the 
consequences of the Fed's violating Bagehotian rules in (2010) was that such 
policy was "a probable prelude to inflation and future crises dwarfing the 
current one" – though he did not repeat this message in (2012) - while the 
very title of a (2009) New York Times column by Allan Meltzer - "Inflation 
Nation" - speaks for itself. Though these predictions and others like them 
were carefully hedged by suggestions that such effects were not going to be 
immediate, it is hard to avoid concluding that the behaviour of the US price 
level - not to mention that of all reasonable measures of the money supply - 
over the last four years has shown them to be at least exaggerated, and 
perhaps outright misplaced. A more plausible view of the effects of the 
explosion of the Fed's monetary liabilities since 2008 might be that it 
prevented a collapse of the money supply such as took place between 1929 
and 1933 along with all the destructive real consequences that would have 
followed on from it, but was not on a large enough scale to promote 
recovery.  
 Perhaps also, however, the way in which these recent awkward facts 
seem to contradict the dire predictions of some of the Fed's critics reflects 
further problems with the analysis which yielded them. Anyone who follows 
the theoretical lead of such contemporary commentators on the Great 
Depression as Hawtrey (1932) or Currie (1934), rather than, say Fisher, and 
regards a falling price level as a by-product of real contraction, rather than as 
its principal cause, would also argue, along with Humphrey (2012) be it 
noted, that, once the central bank's immediate obligations to stabilize the 
financial system in the wake of a crisis have been met, monetary policy's 
task is not over, but that it must then be deployed to stimulating the real 
economy, a goal that could have been pursued at little risk of igniting 
inflation in the circumstances that prevailed after 1929, and, as I have just 
remarked, could have been safely pursued more vigorously than it has been 




This brings the argument back to our earlier discussions of the Fisher effect. 
Meltzer's and Taylor's concerns about maintaining rule guided monetary 
policy in today's economy make perfect sense in the context of the theory of 
monetary policy in which this effect plays a central role, and is based on the 
axiom that the market economy is indeed inherently stable, absent major 
policy mistakes that create serious disturbances to the behaviour of the price 
level.21. This is hardly the place to begin a systematic critique of this way of 
thinking, which I have, in any case, mounted in earlier work (2010, 2011). 
Suffice it to say, then, that those of us who are out of sympathy with it, and 
therefore out of sympathy with much of the response to monetary policy 
during the Great Recession discussed above, perhaps also need to rethink 
our acceptance of the Monetarist re-evaluation of the lessons of the Great 
Depression for macroeconomics more generally.  
 More specifically, and to take up explicitly the question that 
motivated this paper, though we may not need to question what this re-
evaluation had to say about the failure of policy after 1929, because the very 
different policies pursued since 2008 and the very different course 
subsequently taken by the economy on the whole seem to imply that here it 
was largely correct – pace Krugman (2008) - we surely ought to pay much 
more attention to what went wrong in the run up to both crises, and to what 
these failures subsequently entailed for the capacity of the market economy 
to right itself and continue functioning in their wake without a great deal of 
help from the central bank. In each case, the violence of the collapse, and the 
extent of the measures needed to cope with it, were of a magnitude much 
bigger than it seems plausible to attribute  - pace Taylor (2011) – to the 
effects of applying a rather modest if belated degree of monetary contraction 
to an otherwise well functioning system. It seems more likely that in the 
cases of both the Great Depression and the Great Recession, much of the 
damage to the real economy that revealed itself in the wake of the crises 
themselves, and proved so difficult to repair, had been inflicted before they 
struck, under circumstances where monetarist indicators were giving no 
warning signals of major trouble.   
 
                                                 
systematically increase the monetary base 
 
21 It was precisely this intellectual framework in which, as argued earlier, the Fisher effect also finds its 
natural habitat, that, at the beginning of the Great Recession in 2008 prompted 628 economists to oppose 
the TARP legislation  because, among other things, they believed that the then widely evident disruption of 
the financial system was a "temporary" phenomenon that did not call for intervention on the scale that this 
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